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Abstract—We propose a concept of using Software Defined 
Network (SDN) technology and machine learning algorithms for 
monitoring and detection of malicious activities in the SDN data 
plane. The statistics and features of network traffic are generated 
by the native mechanisms of SDN technology. In order to conduct 
tests and a verification of the concept, it was necessary to obtain a 
set of network workload test data. We present virtual 
environment which enables generation of the SDN network 
traffic. The article examines the efficiency of selected  machine 
learning methods: Self Organizing Maps and Learning Vector 
Quantization and their enhanced versions. The results are 
compared with other SDN-based IDS. 
 
Keywords—Software Defined Network, intrusion detection, 
machine learning, Mininet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
oftware-defined network (SDN) is a modern approach to 
networking that abolishes the complexity and static nature 
of legacy distributed network architectures. It is achieved 
through the use of a standards-based software abstraction 
between the network control plane and underlying data 
forwarding plane, including both physical and virtual devices. 
This gives an opportunity to use the native SDN functionality 
for monitoring malicious activities within the data plane. The 
SDN-based intrusion detection system can be considered as an 
additional monitoring mechanism, besides the classic security 
solution [1] [2]. In our approach, the parameters and statistics, 
extracted from the fine-grained SDN flows, create tuples of 
features that are classified by detection mechanisms. It allows 
to identify a specific connections representing different 
network activities. However, selection of appropriate machine 
learning classification technique enabling proper identification 
of particular types of malicious traffic become an important 
issue for our approach. The variety proposals for using IDS in 
IP-based networks are presented in many papers (e.g. 
[3][4][5][6]) but only few publications deal with the 
implementation of this technique in Software Defined 
Networks [7][8][9][10][11][12]. In this paper we present the 
results of evaluation of selected machine learning algorithms 
and provide recommendations on their use for intrusion 
detection in SDN environment.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the 
architecture of our approach. The third chapter introduces the 
selected machine  learning  methods SOM and LVQ1. Chapter 
 IV presents the results of the experiments and contains the 
comparison of performance of our conception with other 
SDN-based IDS methods. The paper is summarized with some 
conclusions. 
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
We propose a concept of using the native features of SDN 
technology for monitoring and detection of malicious 
activities, which we call MADMAS. The intrusion detection 
system consists of 4 main modules as presented in Fig. 1.The 
Flow Bundle Module extracts traffic statistics from the fine 
grained data flows. The Integrator collects and processes the 
traffic statistics enabling generation some additional features. 
These two modules compose the Features Generator (FG). It 
outcomes are passed to the Machine Learning-based Classifier, 
which is responsible for detection of the malicious activities in 
the data plane. Controller supervises operations performed by 
the modules and processes the results of the traffic 
classification for visualization. At this stage of our study the 
Classifier and Controller reside on the workstation.  
  
 
Fig. 1. SDN-based intrusion detection architecture 
We assumes that the features of network traffic are measured 
by the native mechanisms of SDN technology. The Flow 
Bundle Module works at the SDN Opendaylight controller as 
an OSGi bundle.[13] The flows are matched base on the 
following parameters: 
 destination IP address, 
On Efficiency of Selected Machine Learning 
Algorithms for Intrusion Detection in Software 
Defined Networks 
Damian Jankowski, Marek Amanowicz 
S 
248  D. JANKOWSKI, M. AMANOWICZ 
 
 source IP address, 
 destination TCP/UDP port, 
 source TCP/UDP port, 
 protocol type (ARP, IP, TCP, UDP or unknown). 
 
For each flow an idle timeout parameter is set. It defines the 
period after the entries are deleted from the flow table. In 
addition, an identification number is assigned to each flow. 
This way of matching traffic, distinguishes flows in terms of 
different port numbers and IP addresses. The exemplary 
network activity may consist of multiple flows. In presented 
approach the collected features are used as input vector for 
detection mechanism. For each flow, a set of parameters is 
determined. For classification purposes, the input vector X(x1, 
x2,, …, x9)  is represented by: 
x1 -packet count in a flow, 
x2  -bytes count in a flow, 
x3 -destination TCP/UDP port, 
x4  -source TCP/UDP port, 
x5   -duration, 
x6  -flows with different ports from source host, 
x7  -flows with same ports to destination host, 
x8 - flow rate to the host, 
x9  -single flow rate to the host. 
III. SELECTED MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
Let us consider the following algorithms that can be used 
for classification of malicious activities in the SDN data plane, 
i.e: 
• Self-Organizing Maps (SOM)  
• Multi-pass Self-Organizing Maps (M-SOM), 
• Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ1), 
• Multi-pass Learning Vector Quantization (M-LVQ1) 
• Hierarchical Learning Vector Quantization (H-LVQ1). 
Above algorithms are types of artificial neural networks 
(ANN) that is trained using unsupervised (SOM based) or 
supervising (LVQ1 based) learning technique. In response to 
input signals, network indicates the activation of neurons in 
varying degrees. Neurons (nodes) compete for the right to 
respond to a subset of the input data. The neuron whose weight 
vector is most similar to the input is called the best matching 
unit (BMU) or best matching neuron (BMN). A distance 
measure between input patterns must be defined, in our case it 
is a Euclidean distance (see equation 2). In the presented 
algorithms, it is necessary to carry out an initialization phase. 
This is the arrangement of specific positions of neurons in the 
considered space. Typically, the initial distribution of neurons 
can be created in a random way [14]. 
Neurons in SOM can be associated with its other 6 
neighbours in a hexagonal manner. The most stimulated 
neuron and neighbouring neurons update the weights in 
response to learning vectors. 
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where: X – input vector of features, Wi – i weight vector of the 
neuron at k time, ηi – learning rate, G(r) - neighbourhood 
function (3). 
The distances of input vector X(x1, x2, …, xj) to winner neurons 
W(w1, w2, … , wj) are calculated on base of the Euclidean 
distance. 
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where: X – input vector of features, xj – j feature in X input 
vector, Wi - i weight vector of the neuron, wij – j value of weight 
in i weight vector of the neuron. 
The degree of weight adaptation G(i) of winner and 
neighbourhoods neurons is calculated by Gaussian formula. 
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where: r - Euclidean distance of i neuron from winner neuron, 
W –winner neuron, λ– neighbourhood radius. 
During the learning process , weights of neurons are 
adapted to learning input vector. In other words, neurons or 
groups of neurons, are activated in response to stimulation, 
adapting to the form of specific patterns. When input vectors 
are labelled, SOM can be used as a classification mechanism. 
The SOM network allows to create a type of structure, which 
can represent input vectors in the best way. It can be said, that 
the single neuron represents many vectors from the dataset. 
The class is assigned to the neuron with the consideration of 
which class is the most numerous, from stimulating vectors. 
The classification step is preformed after learning. During the 
network testing, the test vectors activate neurons of a trained 
network which are the most similar. This involves determining 
which labelled neuron is activated under the input vector. After 
the process of learning, SOM network can be presented to low 
dimension space by Sammon mapping and visualised by 
U-matrix, U*-matrix, P-matrix. [14][15]. 
Multi-Pass SOM is the implementation of the SOM 
algorithm where two passes are performed on the same 
underlying model. The first pass is a rough ordering pass with 
large neighbourhood radius, learning rate and small training 
time. The second pass is the fine tuning pass that has a longer 
training time, small initial neighbourhood radius value and 
smaller initial learning rate  [16]. 
Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) may also be 
considered as special case of an artificial neural network 
architecture, learned in a supervised way. The LVQ network 
has a set of units and weight vectors Wi associated to them. In 
this paper, we consider 3 versions of LVQ1 for traffic 
classification. In LVQ1 each input vector has a class assigned 
to them that the network would like to learn. At step k, given a 
vector X randomly chosen from the input data. Then the nearest 
Wi  vector is selected, according to the Euclidean distance  d(X, 
Wi) given by (2). After that the vector Wi is updated in the 
following way: 

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where: X – input vector of features, Wi(k) – i weight vector of 
the neuron at k time, ηi – learning rate [17]. 
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In Multi-Pass, the quick rough pass is made on the model using 
LVQ1 with relative large learning rate, then a long fine tuning 
pass is made on the model with LVQ1 and smaller learning 
rate. In Hierarchical LVQ implementation each codebook 
vector is treated as a cluster centroid. All codebook vectors are 
evaluated and part of that vectors are selected as candidates for 
sub-models. The sub-models are constructed for all candidate 
codebook vectors and those sub-models that outperform their 
parent codebook vector are kept as part of the model. During 
testing, a dataset tuple is first mapped onto its BMU, if that 
BMU has a sub-model, the sub model is used for classification, 
otherwise the class value in the BMU is used for classification  
[16]. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS  
A. Dataset generation 
The architecture of the testbed we used for evaluation of 
machine learning algorithms and their applicability for 
intrusion detection in SDN environment is shown in the 
Figure 2. A simplified SDN network is emulated in the Mininet 
[18], while the server is emulated by Metasploitable 2 virtual 
machines with the Ubuntu operating system. Vulnerabilities in 
services and operating systems, default passwords and 
misconfigurations are intentionally left on the server 
environment. The clients generate requests to the server, at the 
same time, the malicious host performs unauthorized activities 
directed to servers by using attack tools. The course of 
emulation is automated by Python scripts. Generated traffic is 
probing by the measurement module. The servers reside on 
separate virtual machines and clients are virtualized at the level 
of Mininet OS. In order to achieve the most realistic character 
of the generated attacks, malicious activity are conducted using 
special tools (see Tab I). Each class of such traffic has 
subclasses, which define the detailed course of action, types of 
attack tools or exploits that are directed at the network or server 
resources. 
For instance, the malicious hosts perform a flooding attack 
on the SDN network by Nping tool with specific parameters. 
These events have an impact both on the SDN controller 
performance and the available data plane resources, and can 
cause delays in processes of matching flows. The probe class 
includes attacks that are intended to obtain information about 
the object of attack. These attacks include ports, version, 
services or vulnerability scanning. Such malicious activities 
performed by Metasploit or Nmap tools give information to the 
intruders about the potential targets of the attacks. This kind of 
activity may be a preliminary phase of the main attack, i.e. DoS 
or buffer overflow. 
The U2R class includes network activities related with the 
back doors and remote exploitation attacks. The attacks are 
performed by Metasploit Framework scripts and commands. 
These malicious activities are carried out against the 
vulnerable services, which are used in normal traffic. 
Therefore, these attacks are characterised by a high degree of 
similarity to the short duration normal traffic. Firstly, the 
malicious requests prepared by Metasploit are sent to the 
vulnerable service. The payload contains the exploit and 
shellcode for the specified service. After the exploiting 
operation, the malicious host gains access to the shell with root 
privileges. At the next step, the malicious host establish the 
connection to the exploited service, with the reverse shell and 
execute a few Linux commands. The type of exploit and 
detailed course of the attack may vary for individual services. 
For instance, before exploit steps, the user login may take 
place. Each stage of the attack is reflected in SDN fine 
granulated flows. 
The R2L class includes the credentials guessing and the 
unauthorised access to IT accounts. The password guessing is 
conducted in the form of dictionary attack. The potential 
passwords and logins are stored in external file. The malicious 
hosts try to authorise with parameters from lists of credentials. 
Sequential requests are sent to the service. When the 
authorisation succeeds, the corresponding credentials are 
stored. These activities generate moderate number of flows.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Testbed architecture  
 
B. Evaluation Methodology 
All our experiments were performed using the WEKA with 
additional plugin [16][19]. For testing purposes, 10 fold cross 
validation was used. The features of input vector X are 
normalized in the range [0,1]. The formulas below show the 
metrics used for evaluation of classification models, i.e.: 
- True Positive Rate 
FNTP
TP
TPR


         
(6)
 
TABLE I 
CLASSES OF NETWORK ACTIVITIES 
Classes 
of traffic 
Description of 
activities 
Tools for traffic generation 
normal Traffic between 
clients and servers 
Clients and servers of following 
services FTP, SSH, SMB, Apache, 
Web, Tomcat, RMI Ruby, Java RMI, 
Postgres, Telnet 
probe Port probe,  
vulnerability scan, 
version scan 
Metasploit, Nmap 
R2L Credentials 
guessing 
Metasploit, Hydra 
DoS Denial of service 
attacks 
Metasploit, Hping3, Nping 
U2R Remote exploits, 
backdoors, 
Metasploit 
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where: TP – True Positive,  FN – False Negative , 
- False Positive Rate 
TNFP
FP
FPR


        
(7)
 
where: FP – False Positive, TN – True Negative,  
- Precision or Positive Predictive Value 
FPTP
TP
PPV


        
(8)
 
The conformity of the neural net with the input data was 
assessed by calculation of the average quantization error 
according to the following formula [20]: 

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where: Xi – input vector, Mc – best matching neurons (BMN) 
The best neural net is expected to have the smallest average 
quantization error. 
C. Results 
The overall results are summarized in Table II. The analysis 
indicate that it is possible to achieve an average value of TPR 
greater than 94%. However, in constructed models, size of the 
networks exceeds the number of 800 neurons. H-LVQ1 
algorithm is an effective way to improve TPR, precision and 
FPR compared to SOM, M-SOM, LVQ1, M-LVQ1 for all 
classes. Class U2R has the worst TPR and FPR metrics for all 
classification algorithms. The best TPR and PPV results are 
achieved for  Probe and DoS classes. M-SOM and M-LVQ 
algorithms slightly improve efficiency in comparison to LVQ 
and SOM. Moreover, there is the visible advantage of H-LVQ1 
in efficiency for all classes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
TRUE POSITIVE RATE [%] PER CLASS 
TP Rate of 
class 
SOM 
Multipass 
SOM 
LVQ1 
Multipass 
LVQ1 
Hierarchical 
LVQ1 
Normal 97,8 98,0 98,1 98,1 98,6 
Probe 96,3 96,1 96,1 96,2 98,7 
R2L 74,8 77,6 83,5 83,4 94,6 
DoS 47,0 48,3 80,5 83,2 99,6 
U2R 3,1 5,6 0,8 1,1 48,3 
 
TABLE II 
EFFICIENCY OF SELECTED ALGORITHMS  
Evaluation 
metrics 
SOM 
Multipass 
SOM 
LVQ1 
Multipass 
LVQ1 
Hierarchical 
LVQ1 
TPR [%] 94,4 94,6 95,6 95,6 98,1 
FPR [%] 3,9 3,9 3,2 3,1 1,9 
PPV [%] 93,8 94,2 95,2 95,3 98 
Total Model 
Preparation 
Time [ms] 
2151 4502 634 820 920 
 
 
TABLE IV 
FALSE POSITIVE RATE [%] PER CLASS 
FP Rate of 
class 
SOM 
Multipass 
SOM 
LVQ1 
Multipass 
LVQ1 
Hierarchical 
LVQ1 
Normal 4,8 5 4,3 4,1 2,1 
Probe 3,1 2,9 2 1,9 0,9 
R2L 1 0,8 0,5 0,5 0,3 
DoS 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 0 
U2R 0 0 0 3,1 0,2 
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Fig. 3. Self-organizing maps U*-matrix visualization 
 
Fig. 4. Average Quantization Error , TPR, FPR versus the number of neuron  
 
SOM and M-SOM methods are characterized by the highest 
time required to build the classification model. At the same 
time, SOM and M-SOM have the worst values of TPR and 
FPR. Visualization of U*-matrix, reflecting the average 
Euclidean distance between the codebook vectors of 
neighbouring neurons is shown in Fig 3. Let us consider 2 
clusters, represented by the blue areas of the map. The first 
cluster at left side is represented by neurons mainly assigned to 
probe and normal class. There is also individual hexagons with 
DoS, R2L and U2R class. The second cluster is located at the 
top of the map. There is a preponderance of neutrons assigned 
to class DoS. In the second cluster, there are single hexagons 
with classes normal, R2L and U2R. The green area between 
clusters contains normal class. A small cluster in the lower 
right corner, includes class DoS and normal. This means that 
the classes are not well separated.  
Fig 4 illustrates the Average Quantisation Error (AQE), TPR 
and FPR versus the number of neurons in the SOM and LVQ1. 
It is evident that LVQ1 has smaller AQE and FPR and bigger 
TPR then SOM for over the range of curves. As we can see, 
there is significant growth of efficiency to specified threshold 
(about 1000 neurons), above this level we do not get a 
significant increase in value of TPR, FPR and AQE. 
Attack classes probe, DoS and R2L are characterized by the 
best TPR and FPR. The results indicate poor efficency for U2R 
class. The most likely explanation of the negative result is that 
the features generated from flows are not optimal for remote 
exploits attacks [21]. One possible solution is to develop 
additional methods of features extraction. To overcome this 
drawback, it is necessary to adapt a Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) technique.  
D. MADMAS Evaluation 
Table V presents the efficency of MADMAS in  compare to 
other selected SDN-based IDS methods. We considered the 
following alternatives: 
 Method 1 - Revisiting Traffic Anomaly Detection 
Using Software Defined Net-working [7], 
 Method 2 - A Fuzzy Logic-Based Information Security 
Management for Software Defined Networks [8], 
 Method 3 - Combining OpenFlow and sFlow for an 
effective and scalable anomaly detection and 
mitigation mechanism on SDN environments [9], 
 Method 4 - Lightweight DDoS flooding attack 
detection using NOX/OpenFlow [10], 
 Method 5 - Efficient Anomaly Detection And 
Mitigation In Software Defined Networking 
Environment [11], 
 Method 6 - Flexible Network-Based Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System on 
Software-Defined Networks [12]. 
It needs to be highlighted that verification of considered 
methods was carried out in different environments, according 
to various methodologies. Nevertheless the results presented in 
Tab. V can give a generic view on their efficiency. The 
considered  methods can detect certain types of malicious 
activities, i.e.: denial of service, distributed denial of service 
port scan, but only our method and Method 5 detect U2R and 
R2L attacks (remote exploits, passwords guessing etc.). It is 
evident that MADMAS gives higher TPR values for DoS, 
Probe, U2R classes in compare to other solutions. Method 3 
gives better results of TPR for Probe and DDoS attacks, 
however at high value of FPR (23-27%). It should be also 
noticed that efficiency of U2R detection by MADMAS is still 
too low that would require further works.  
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In the paper we presented the convincing concept of 
detection of malicious activities in SDN data plane. We show 
the benefits of using MADMAS for identification the selected 
threats and its advantage over other considered solutions. 
However, an additional work has to be done to improve the 
efficiency of detection of U2R attacks that would include 
implementation of deep packet inspection technique. The 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY (TPR AND FPR IN [%]) 
SDN based IDS 
methods 
 
DoS, DDoS 
Probe, 
Scan  
R2L  U2R  
MADMAS 
TPR 99,6  98,7 94,6 48,3 
FPR 2,1 0,9 0,3 0 
Method 1 
TPR 94 90 
x x 
FPR 0 0-4 
Method 2 
 
TPR 95 
X X X 
FPR 1,2 
Method 3 
TPR 100 100 
x X 
FPR 27 23 
Method 4 
TPR 99,11 
X x X 
FPR 0,46 
Method 5 
TPR 90,9 91,9 80,2 98,1 
FPR 0,1 0,24 0,69 0,88 
Method 6 
TPR 96,4 92,1 
x x 
FPR x x 
 
252  D. JANKOWSKI, M. AMANOWICZ 
 
 
obtained results indicate also some advantage of using the 
Hierarchical LVQ1 in compare to other techniques. On the 
basis of the promising findings presented in this paper, work on 
the remaining issues is still continuing. The next stage of our 
research will focus on improving of features generation and on 
applicability of other statistical techniques for detection and  
classification of  malware traffic. Further research on 
monitoring of traffic in SDN control plane is also planned. 
Therefore, it would allow to expand functionality of 
MADMAS to detect attacks against the controllers and 
management stations. 
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